

# The Ryukyuanist

A Newsletter on Ryukyuan/Okinawan Studies

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**In this issue**, the desk offers a tentative response to the call for wisdom on the Diaoyu/Senkaku question issued by the late paramount leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, a quarter of a century ago.

Dr. James Kawakami reviews *The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium*, edited by David Arase (2003).

A note of appreciation for publications received.

Dr. Victor Okim mourns the death of a distinguished fellow Okinawan: Mr. Masao Nakachi

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## The Sino-Japanese Dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: What Price Sovereignty?

Which country should the islands called Diaoyu by the Chinese and Senkaku by the Japanese belong to, China or Japan? Currently, these islands are a part of Japanese territory. China also claims sovereignty over them. At the time of signing the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the then Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China said: "Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this [Diaoyu/Senkaku] question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all."

We, the people of the 21st century, are Deng Xiaoping's "next generation." Although it is doubtful that we are any wiser than our predecessors, we can at least try to improve our understanding of the issues that he has entrusted with us for resolution.

Our generation has made a first step in that direction by a well researched book on the Diaoyu/ Senkaku question, Unryu Suganuma's *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000).

### The origins of the dispute

The Diaoyu Islands are China's *irredenta*, an area that historically belonged to China but is currently under Japanese control (to adapt the dictionary definition of the word). There is a powerful current of *irredentism* concerning these islands among Chinese people not only in China proper, but all over the world. Many Chinese feel that China was unjustly deprived of the Diaoyu Islands and that these islands should be a rightful part of Chinese territory.

Major support for Chinese *irredentism* comes from the history of relations between Imperial China (Ming and Qing) and the Ryukyu Kingdom. The acknowledged boundary between China and Ryukyu until the demise of the Ryukyu Kingdom was somewhere in the sea east and south of the Diaoyu Islands (west and north of the Ryukyu Islands). This Sino-Ryukyuan boundary became a Sino-Japanese boundary when Japan took over Ryukyu and replaced it with Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. After the incorporation of Ryukyu in the empire of Japan, the Japanese government turned its attention to other small islands in the surrounding seas. In 1885, Tokyo declared sovereignty over the North and South Ufuagarijima (today's Daitō) Islands and placed them under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. About this time, the Japanese-appointed governor of Okinawa petitioned Tokyo for the take-over of the Diaoyu Islands. (Another uninhabited island to the south of the Daitō Islands was added to the Daitō group as Okino Daitōjima in 1900.)

The Japanese government hesitated first, but finally decided to incorporate the Diaoyu Islands in Japanese territory in January 1895 in the midst of the Sino-Japanese War, which was terminated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in November of the same year. The Treaty stipulates, among other things, that China cedes to Japan "the island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa" [Article II {b}]. Whether the Diaoyu Islands, which were not called Senkaku by Japan until 1900, are implied in "islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa" is an unsettled question between China and Japan. China's answer is affirmative, while Japan insists that these islands were *terra nullius* when Japan took over. Japan justifies its position by the international law of how *terra nullius* becomes a specific state's territory. The legality of the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyu Islands at the particular date of January 14, 1895 as well as the question of how these islands figured in the negotiation for the Treaty of Shimonoseki deserves renewed attention.

After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese government placed the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of Yaeyama County (comprising the southernmost island group of Okinawa Prefecture) and leased some of them to a Japanese entrepreneur, Koga Tatsushiro, who used the islands as a bonito fishing and processing base. The Diaoyu Islands were uninhabited before Koga came. In 1942, the Koga enterprise folded and all the human agents left the islands, returning the Diaoyu, now Senkaku, Islands to the earlier uninhabited state.

### **World War II and territorial re-alignment**

Losing the Pacific War, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 25, 1945 and unconditionally surrendered to the Allies on August 15. The Potsdam Proclamation was jointly issued by the Three Great Allies: the United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain. With respect to the postwar territory of Japan, the Proclamation stipulates, among others:

(Article 8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 by the same Three Great Allies states:

... Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914 and all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Months before Potsdam, in early days of the Battle for Okinawa, U.S. military government was established over occupied islands and adjacent waters of the Ryukyu Islands, "suspending" "all powers of the Government of the Japanese Empire" (Article II, United States Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 1). This proclamation had serious implications for the subsequent evolution of the status of Okinawa. There was no mention of the Senkaku Islands, but these islands had by then been under the administrative jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture for nearly fifty years. The U.S. simply assumed that they were part of the Ryukyu Islands, which the U.S. detached from Japan at this time.

In January 1946, SCAP/GHQ in Tokyo took a first tentative step for the definition of the "minor islands" referred to in the Potsdam Proclamation. The Memorandum Concerning Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, dated 29 January 1946, "excludes" from Japan a large number of islands and areas. Among them are the Ryukyu Islands south of 30 degrees North Latitude. Among other areas excluded are "Formosa and the Pescadores."

In hindsight, the stock phrase "Formosa and the Pescadores" is highly imprecise, because it is not clear whether "Formosa" is also understood to include those "islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa" referred to in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. The basic confusion at this stage of attempts to define Japan is that geography is the primary criterion, while administrative jurisdiction is apparently of secondary importance, for naming islands or areas for inclusion in or exclusion from Japan. If in place of "Formosa and the Pescadores" an expression were used referring to all the areas under the jurisdiction of imperial Japan's governor general of Taiwan, there would be no ambiguity of what islands should be included in "Formosa and the Pescadores." The use of administrative jurisdiction would also clearly leave the Senkaku Islands out of "Formosa and the Pescadores," keeping them in former Okinawa Prefecture, now re-named Ryukyu Islands during the period of American occupation.

A treaty of peace between Japan and the Allied Powers should have resolved these and other questions regarding the definition of Japanese territory. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, however, fell short of the desired settlement of territorial issues. Between 1945 and 1951, there occurred a sea change in world politics: the outbreak of the Cold War. In 1949, the government of the Republic of China, one of the Three Great Allies of Cairo and Potsdam, retreated to Taiwan and its realm shrank to a few coastal islands of the continent and "Formosa and the Pescadores." Even for holding down this shrunken territory, the ROC needed the protection of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other U.S. military aid. While the ROC continued to represent "China" in the international arena, "China" in the continent was governed by the People's Republic of China. In June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the PRC was soon drawn into the conflict. Under the circumstances, the peace treaty with Japan to settle the score for the Pacific War morphed into a treaty to recruit Japan into the "Free World." The San Francisco Peace Treaty was drafted by the United States with assistance of Great Britain and railroaded through the San Francisco peace conference. Significantly, neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to participate in the peace conference.

The hasty conclusion of a "partial" peace with Japan under the exigencies of the Cold War left several territorial and other issues unresolved, as discussed by John Price in his *JPRI Working Paper No. 78, "A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective"* (June 2001). The question of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands would have been an appropriate subject to take up in the course of the preparation of the peace treaty. However, regarding what was to become in the Peace Treaty "Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)" (Article 3), the U.S. and the U.K. were firmly set on the idea of "residual sovereignty," that is, territorial sovereignty, retained by Japan over these islands. In other words, the states that acceded to the San Francisco Peace Treaty recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.

### **The Ryukyu Islands and Japan's "residual sovereignty"**

In December 1950, in anticipation of the peace treaty with Japan, the U.S. Military Government in Okinawa was reorganized and renamed the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). The USCAR spawned its Ryukyuan counterpart, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) staffed by Ryukyuan. The Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, dated 29 February 1952, precisely defined the area of "political and geographic jurisdiction" of the GRI in terms of longitude and latitude (Article 1). The area so defined included the Senkaku Islands, thus placing them within the area controlled by USCAR.

About this time, Japan and the ROC were preparing their own peace treaty based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The bilateral treaty was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952. There was no mention of Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. "China" failed to seize a major opportunity to discuss and assert (or at least reserve) sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Did this failure signify that "China" had abandoned the Diaoyu Islands as a part of its territory? Suganuma speculates: "It is inevitable to say that representatives from the ROC failed to recall the existence of the Diaoyu Islands." (p. 123). The ROC's amnesia was fatal. It would not be easy to defend this loss of memory or subsequently to revive the ROC as a viable participant in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. (For a defense of the ROC's position regarding Diaoyu/Senkaku, see the helpful monograph by Qiu Hongda, *Diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan zhengzhi wenti ji qi jiejie fangfadi yanjiu* [Diaoyutai Islands Sovereignty Dispute Problem and a Study of Its Solution Methods], Taipei, 1991).

"China" represented by the PRC has fared better. The PRC was not a participant in the making of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, it went on record denouncing it with good reason. (On this, see Price cited above.) In denouncing the treaty, the PRC rejected the theory of Japan's residual sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands during the post-Peace period of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands that ended in May 1972. When Sino-Japanese relations were normalized later in 1972, the PRC and Japan explicitly agreed to shelve the issue of sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku for future consideration. When the two countries signed the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, they again "agreed not to touch upon this question" (Deng Xiaoping's statement: Suganuma, p. 238). Thus, "China" can be said to have repeatedly objected to and denied the legitimacy of, the Japanese control of the Diaoyu Islands. This is a strong legal and moral position, all the more so when buttressed by historical evidence. In February 1992, the PRC adopted its Territorial Water Law, which claims sovereignty over Diaoyu, among others. Japan promptly lodged a series of protests against this claim.

History has come full circle. The origin of the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands was the unilateral decision by Japan to incorporate them in Japanese territory in January 1895. Now the People's Republic of China has unilaterally declared its sovereignty over Diaoyu. Can such a "zero-sum dispute" be settled to the satisfaction of all the parties involved? That is the question that Deng Xiaoping's "next" generations must answer more wisely than his generation was able to.

### **Enter the International Law of the Sea**

The Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku may worsen in the years to come due to new developments in the Law of the Sea after the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978. The Third United Nations Convention of 1982 on the Law of the Sea legitimizes a 12-nautical-mile territorial water from the shore base line and the coastal state's "sovereign rights" over the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf as well as a seaboard or island state's "exclusive economic zone" within 200 nautical miles. In addition, the continental shelf can be extended subject to the approval of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

A continental state would surely seek the most generous delimitation of its continental shelf, while any island, however small, would provide the state to which it belongs the opportunity to claim a maximum permissible area around it as the exclusive economic zone. The Diaoyu Islands lie at the eastern edge of China's continental shelf about 230 nautical miles to the east of Fuzhou. Sovereignty over these islands, if assigned to China, would enable China to claim sovereign rights over the continental shelf plus the exclusive economic zone to the north and east of the Diaoyu Islands. This would give China exclusive economic rights to the whole southern portion of the East China Sea. Seen from the Japanese side, the Senkaku Islands under Japanese sovereignty would entitle Japan to an exclusive economic zone, which would extend Japan's sovereign rights 200 miles to the north and west, substantially encroaching on China's continental shelf.

Clearly the Law of the Sea generates irresistible temptations to secure sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku. A variety of great economic prizes are at stake, not least being potential oil wealth in the area. When sovereign interests collide, an uncivilized first resort is to war as a means of determining which interests should prevail. Indeed, the first question the Japanese asked when the U.S. returned Senkaku to Japan as a part of Okinawa Prefecture in 1972 was whether the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty effectively obligated the U.S. to defend these islands against external attacks.

Fortunately, despite occasional incidents instigated by nationalist extremists in both China and Japan, the governments of both countries have so far been behaving toward each other and with respect to the resources of the East China Sea as if sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku were indeterminate. The degree of moderation demonstrated by both sides is commendable in view of the efforts needed for controlling sovereign urges. The sustained practice of mutual self-restraint under this *as-if* assumption may develop into prior consultation and agreement whenever either side initiates action for utilization of the resources of the East China Sea. After a period of separate action subject to consultation and agreement, China and Japan may see greater merits in joint action and eventually develop an institution like an "East China Sea Economic Community" to jointly manage this marine space as communal property subject to an optimal reconciliation of resource development and conservation as well as environmental protection in accordance with the Law of the Sea.

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## Book Review

*The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium*, edited by **David Arase**. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2003. xi, 390 pp.

The collection of 16 East Asian essays written by former students, peers at Berkeley, and contemporaries, and one by Chalmers Johnson celebrates a forty-year career of Professor **Chalmers Johnson's** outstanding contribution to the understanding of East Asian development.

I suggest that general readers start by reading the marvelous introduction by the editor, Professor **David Arase** of Politics at Pomona College. Comments on Johnson's entire career are given in the last chapter, "Functional Stories: Uses for Communist, Developmental, Military, and Individual Ideologies," by Professor **Lynn T. White III** who teaches in the Politics Department, Woodrow Wilson School, and East Asian Studies Program at Princeton. White argues that Johnson's empirical approach actually uses higher-level abstraction to develop real solutions to real problems. Such solutions tend to escape those who approach the problems mathematically making simplistic assumptions.

Then I suggest reading the introduction by Arase of Section Four "History Restarted, or Deferred? The U.S. Role in Asia" starting with page 255. Then go on to chapter 12 by Chalmers Johnson "The continuation of the Cold War and the Advent of American Militarism." Because of space limitations, I will use short excerpts to describe this and other chapters.

Here is one from Chalmers Johnson's chapter. "When the Cold War seemed to end, the U.S. did not demobilize but instead continued its system of alliances and bases around the world and launched extensive strategic and intellectual efforts to find new threats and situations that demanded its imperial attention. These include an alleged need for a 'humanitarian war' against Serbia, renewed intervention in the Chinese civil war on behalf of Taiwan, and, to maintain 'stability' throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the opening of a new front against left-wing social reform movements in Colombia while continuing to train and equip virtually all the armies of Latin America, and, after September 11, 2001, a unilateral assertion of U.S.

hegemony over the entire world under the guise of fighting a presidentially declared 'war on terrorism' and against rogue states." (p. 260)

After that one can read in more detail the conditions in Okinawa which will allow one to more fully appreciate the dramatic change in Professor Johnson's concept of American foreign policies. Chapter 13: "The Okinawa Factor in U.S. – Japan Relations" is by **Koji Taira**, a native of Okinawa, who is professor emeritus of economics and industrial relations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and currently researching world systems, hegemony, and conflict. President Clinton's speech in Okinawa "conceded a major moral victory to the long-suffering Okinawans --that the status quo of the U.S. base concentration in Okinawa is unfair to them, even in the name of peace in Asia. The U.S. president's concession on this point becomes more remarkable when compared with the deafening silence of the Japanese government about it." (p. 281)

President Clinton said:

*"Of course, Okinawa has played a vital role in allowing it [U.S.-Japan Alliance] to endure. I know that the people of Okinawa did not ask to play this role, and that it sometimes seems like you have borne a heavy burden for peace in Asia. Though this island has less than one percent of the landmass of Japan, it provides 75 percent of the land on which American bases sit."*

In the following Chapter Fourteen, "In Search of Emperor Hirohito: Decision Making and Ideology in Imperial Japan" by **Herbert P. Bix**, we gain an understanding about both past and current successes and problems in modern Japan due to Emperor Hirohito's legacy. The author is a professor of history and sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He won the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Award for his best selling book, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (HarperCollins, 2000).

"Ultimately, the decision to maintain Hirohito on the throne after the defeat, not investigate his role in policy making, and insulate him from criminal investigation and possible trial created more problems than it solved. It contributed to a falsification of history. It impeded historical clarification of the decision-making process leading to war and surrender. It made rethinking the lost war and its atrocities extremely difficult and allowed the Japanese people to prolong bringing their defeat to closure by means of effective apology and reparations. Finally, as a by-product, it reinforced the ancient principle of immunity for the head of state (*legibus solutus*)." (p. 316)

Being unaware of the gritty details of American massacres during the Korean War and even after the war, I had a harrowing experience reading Chapter Fifteen, "Occurrence at No Gun Ri Bridge: An Inquiry into the History and Memory of a Civil War," by **Bruce Cumings** who teaches international history, modern Korean history, and East Asian political economy at the University of Chicago. He has written seminal books on Korea including the two-volume study *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990) and *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (W.W. Norton, 1997).

"On September 30, 1999, a woman named Chon Chun-Ja appeared on the front page of the New York Times, dressed as if she were yet another middle-aged and middle-class Korean housewife going shopping. Instead she stood at the mouth of a tall tunnel in Nogun Village ... She pointed to a hill where, she alleged, in July 1950, 'American soldiers machine-gunned hundreds of helpless civilians under a railroad bridge.'" (p. 313) The few survivors sought compensation for years, but were ignored by both Seoul and Washington. The article also carries the testimony of American soldiers who did the firing, who said that their commander had ordered them to fire on civilians.

One of the other chapters I found particularly interesting was on the Falun Gong by Professor **Maria Hsia Chang** at the University of Nevada whose latest book is *End Days: China's Falun Gong* (Yale University Press, 2004). Her description of the reasons for the crackdown of this group examines Chinese society and history.

Professor **Teruo Gotoda** of Soai University, Osaka, Japan explains how Japan's economy went from a miracle to mediocrity. In a rather complex society, the bottom line seems to be that that the USA-imposed political system must change to begin to restore prosperity. Professors **Peggy K. Takahashi** and **Toshiya Kitayama** at the University of San Francisco and Kwansai Gakuin University respectively go into another level of complexity about necessary changes in how corporations do business in Japan. Very instructive.

One of the most fascinating countries to watch now is South Korea where there is the dramatic shift to democracy after USA-influenced dictatorships were removed a little more than a decade ago. Professor **Mikyun Chin** in the Department of Political Science, Ajou University, Republic of Korea, writes about "Civil Society in South Korean Democratization." She has recently published "Self-Governance, Political Participation, and the Feminist Movement in South Korea," in *Democracy and the Status of Women in Asia* (Lynne Rienner, 2000).

**Kongdan [Katy] Oh** who contributes "South Korea's Foreign Policy: A Dolphin among Whales?" is a staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. She has recently published *The United States and East Asia after 9/11* (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003). An excerpt delineates a crucial problem. "South Korea's dealings with North Korea are complicated by the national interests of the United States as interpreted by the president and Congress. Today South Korea can debate whether the United States is a life preserver or a millstone around its neck." (p. 232)

David Arase writes in his clear manner about "Sino-Japanese Relations in Transition." An excerpt will illustrate the scope of his essay. "At about this time [around 1994] the United States abandoned the idea of drawing down its presence in East Asia and in the Nye Report issued by the Pentagon in 1995, the United States committed itself to maintaining its East Asian strategic posture indefinitely. Contributing factors included the following: China's rise as a potential strategic competitor, the consequences should Japan feel the need to develop an independent defensive capability, North Korea's efforts to develop a nuclear capability, rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait as a result of Taiwan's democratization, and growing unease in Southeast Asia about the consequences of growing intra-regional strategic rivalries." (p. 240)

James H. Kawakami

**James H. Kawakami**, Ph.D., studied under 1979 Nobel Prize Winner in Chemistry, Herbert C. Brown. He helped develop a world-wide used truck transported membrane based nitrogen generating system used in building Boeing airplanes, increasing oil well efficiency, and used in many Third World countries where the more expensive cryogenic nitrogen is not available. As Adjunct Professor at Rutgers University, he developed an AIDS prevention gel for women which is being considered for testing by the NIH in Africa. He has had a long-time interest in political matters.

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### **Publications (XLV)**

With thanks we acknowledge the receipt of the following books, documents, or papers:

CATO Institute. 2003. "Options for Dealing with North Korea" by Ted Galen Carpenter, *Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 73. 7 pp. This and other papers issued by the CATO Institute, mentioned below, offer analyses of East Asian security and the U.S. role in it that would be highly encouraging to peace-loving Okinawans.

Idem. 2003. "The China-Taiwan Military Balance: Implications for the United States" by Ivan Eland. *Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 74. 9 pp.

Idem. 2003. "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" by Ivan Eland. *Policy Analysis*, No. 465. 14 pp.

Idem. 2003. "Iraq: The Wrong War" By Charles V. Pena. *Policy Analysis*, No. 502. 23 pp.

Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark, eds. 2003. *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. vi, 322 pp. (Reviewed in *The Ryukyuanist* No. 61.)

Hook, Glenn D. and Siddle, Richard, eds. 2003. *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity*. Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/RoutledgeCurzon Series. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. xii, 255 pp. (Reviewed in *The Ryukyuanist* No. 61.)

Kawahashi, Noriko and Kuroki, Masako. 2003. "Editor's Introduction: Feminism and Religion in Contemporary Japan," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. 30/Nos. 3-4 (Fall): 207-216. An overview of the current state of feminist research in Japan, synopsis of the contributions to this special issue, and a statement of the editors' stance emphasizing the implications of "the rise of non-Western feminism."

Matsumoto, Hirotake and Tabata, Chiaki, eds. 2004. *Amami fukki 50-nen. Yamato to Naha no hazama de* (Amami, 50 Years After Reversion. Squeezed Between Yamato and Naha). *Gendai no esupuri* bessatsu (An extra of the Modern Esprit). Tokyo: Shibundo. 392 pp. ¥2667 + tax. A valuable collection of essays, reflections, memoirs, etc. on the 1953 reversion of the Northern Ryukyus to Japan and the area's development since then.

Miyazato, Seigen. 1999. *Amerika wa naze Okinawa wo Nihon kara kirihanasita ka* (Why Did America Detach Okinawa From Japan?). Okinawa City. 59 pp. A lecture by an authority in American studies probing the questions why and when the U.S. detached Okinawa from Japan. By an insightful re-interpretation of the 1953 return of the Amami Islands (northern Ryukyus) to Japan despite Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that included the Amami area and that was signed by the "Allies." The unilateral decision by the U.S. to revise (or violate?) the multi-state treaty to make the return of Amami to Japan possible deserves a re-examination of Article 3. The key to the understanding of this anomaly is the concept of "all and any powers" of administration that Article 3 confers on the U.S. with respect to the Ryukyu Islands originally including Amami. Apparently, comprehensive powers like these allows the U.S. to choose at will any degree and method of exercising them and any area over which to exercise them. In other words, "all and any powers" implies "choice not to exercise" these powers. Therefore, when the U.S. decided to "relinquish" these powers with respect to Amami, this U.S. decision alone (without involving other signatories of the San Francisco Treaty) was sufficient to release Amami from U.S. occupation. What subsequently happened to Amami was taken care of by the doctrine of "residual sovereignty" of Japan that automatically ensured Amami's return to Japan when the U.S. no longer wanted to keep it. Similarly, "all and any powers" implies choice to exercise them not in full but in part (by delegating some of them to other entities like the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or the Japanese Government) or to exercise them only in select geographical areas such as the U.S. military bases. In 1972, this implication enabled the U.S. to return Okinawa to Japan while retaining the bases under its "all and any powers." Clearly the discussion of this kind is too legalistic and recondite for laymen to comprehend. Readers will be grateful to Professor Miyazato for explaining in ordinary language what appears to be an ultimate legal/administrative conundrum.

Okinawa University, Institute of Regional Study. 2003. *Chiiki Kenkyūsho Shohō* (Institute Report), No. 29. 72 pp. A special issue on the dynamics of *Kyōdōten* (community-owned stores) in postwar Okinawa. *Kyōdōten* is an institutional invention of Okinawa that dates back to the early 20th Century, often mistaken for a "communist enterprise." The capital stock of the store is owned by the residents of the community on the basis of one person one share. Each resident owns his or her share by right.

University of the Ryukyus, Faculty of Law & Letters. 2003. *Keizai Kenkyū* (Economic Review), No. 66 (September). 94 pp. Two articles address aspects of Okinawan economy: "An Analysis of the Living Standard of Okinawa Prefecture Using Human Development Index (HDI) and Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)" by Tetsuo Umemura, and "Aeronautical Petroleum Oil Tax, Local Public Finance and the Tax Advantage in OKINAWA District" by Koichiro Sawano. According to ranking of 47 Japanese prefectures by HDI and GDI, Okinawa comes next to the last.

WADA Hisanori et al. 2003. *'Ming shilu' no Ryukyu shiryō* (2) (Ryukyu data in the Ming Records). 131 pp. Extracts of references to Ryukyu from the Ming Records over the years 1435 to 1565. The volume contains an analytical introduction, the original Chinese script, interpretive Japanese reading of the same, and notes/annotations/commentaries. During this period, seven emperors (Xuanzong to Shizong) ruled China, while ten Zhongshan kings received imperial investitures and governed Ryukyu. One learns considerable details of how the sovereign-vassal relationship of the tributary system worked.

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**In memoriam: Masao Nakachi (1930-2003)**

Mr. Masao Nakachi, who passed away in September last year, had been widely acknowledged as a prominent journalist and diplomat. He was born in Chatan, Okinawa, on May 22, 1930. At age 2, he moved with his family to Saipan in the Pacific where his father worked for the Japanese military. He returned to Okinawa at the end of the Second World War. In 1952, while attending the University of the Ryukyus, he was awarded a GARIOA scholarship and transferred to the University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. After obtaining a BA degree, he returned to Okinawa and began his journalism career as a reporter in the English-language newspaper, *Morning Star*.

In 1962, he left the newspaper and enrolled in graduate work in journalism at the East West Center of the University of Hawaii in Honolulu. In 1964, after completing his graduate studies, he joined the *Asahi* Newspaper in Tokyo and later moved to the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Japan Times*. He then took up a post in the UN Public Affairs Center in Tokyo, Japan.

In 1972, he was re-assigned to the UN Headquarters in New York and continued his Public Affairs work there until 1990 when he retired. In retirement, he worked for the Okinawa Prefectural Government as a Liaison and Information Officer. In addition, he served as a goodwill ambassador of Okinawa and as President of the Okinawa People Association of New York. In 2002, he finally left his “retirement work” altogether.

At 1 p.m. on September 7, 2003, after surgery on his gall bladder, he lost his long battle with diabetes and kidney failure. He was survived by his wife of 45 years, Sueko Nakachi, a daughter, of Manhasset, New York, and a son, New York City.

I have known Masao for several decades. My personal and professional association with him dates back to the 1950s. While he was a reporter for the *Morning Star* in Okinawa, I was a press liaison officer in the Office of Public Information, United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and later a reporter with the Okinawa News Bureau, *Pacific Stars & Stripes*. When he was a graduate student at the East West Center, I was an undergraduate majoring in political science at the University of Hawaii. He was there for 2 years while I stayed for 4 years to complete my BA degree.

Again, from 1991 through 2002, I worked with him for over 10 years in Washington, DC, helping him obtain US government and military documents pertaining to Okinawa and facilitating the official functions and activities of the Okinawa Prefectural Government in dealing with the U.S. Government. Because of his valuable contributions to Okinawa and its people, the *Okinawa Times* in 1998 honored him with a Special Award for International Understanding & Cooperation. I deeply mourn the loss of my dear friend & great colleague. I sorely miss him personally and professionally.

On behalf of herself and her bereaved family, Mrs. Nakachi expresses her sincere appreciation for concerns and affections received from many of her husband's friends and acquaintances reinforcing her belief that her late husband had had a happy and fruitful life.

Victor Okim  
US-Japan Research Services

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