

# The Ryukyuanist

A Newsletter on Ryukyu/Okinawa Studies

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In this issue, we express our dismay at Sino-Japanese frictions in the East China Sea and explore how to keep the residents of the Ryukyu Islands out of harm's way in the event the situation deteriorates further. Dr. Gabriele Vogt, who was visiting the University of the Ryukyus in the fall of 2004, contributes a memoir of the mayoral election that she observed in the city of her temporary residence, Naha. Publications (XLVII)

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## The use of the law of war for Okinawans' human security and survival

### (1) A new (in)security environment

The East China Sea has lately acquired an unflattering epithet: a "sea of conflict." Even armed clashes between China and Japan in the near future are no longer unimaginable. Okinawans will be victims of a war again! Although they cannot change the major powers' decisions, they might find help and safety in the Law of War, a.k.a. International Humanitarian Law.

First, a few words on how a tsunami of war might rise up and spread in the East China Sea. In December 2004, the Japanese government released the Defense White Paper, in which for the first time Japan explicitly called China a potential security threat to Japan. This is a quasi-declaration of war, at least of cold war. In January 2005, the Defense Agency revealed an internal document detailing Japan's "island defense strategy" with reference to the Nansei Shotô (Ryukyu Islands). Three phases of operations are distinguishable in this strategy. The first is surveillance, intelligence, and early warning. In the second phase, warships and fighter planes discover, engage and repel intruding enemies in the sea. If enemies invade an island, the third phase sets in: reinforced manpower and firepower destroy the enemies and take the island back. (The idea and practice of "island defense" have a long history in Japan. Cf. Gordon L. Rottman, *Japanese Pacific Island Defenses 1941-45*, illustrated by Ian Palmer, Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2003)

The force level for the defense of the Nansei Shotô will increase. The status of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) stationed there will be upgraded from the current mixed group to a regular brigade. There will be new force deployments and base-building activities in the Southern Ryukyu Islands (Miyako and Yaeyama). The many undefended islands in the Southern Ryukyus worry the Japanese defense planners in Tokyo. While the primary sources of conflict are the Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and disagreements over the boundary of exclusive economic zones, the announced island defense strategy considers all islands in the Miyako-Yaeyama area vulnerable to external aggression. (On the issues surrounding the D/S Islands, see *The Ryukyuanist*, No. 63.)

The defense planners in Tokyo also have plans in the event a crisis exceeds the capability of the Okinawa-based Self Defense Forces. The SDFs stationed throughout Kyushu are programmed quickly to mobilize Ground, Air, and Maritime forces to 55,000 troop strength. The forces are then dispatched to the Southern Ryukyus in two parts, one via the East China Sea and another via the Pacific Ocean. The dispatch of **Self Defense Forces** to a theater of war over hundreds of kilometers of salt water appears to be no different from an aggressive projection of military power. This specter of "defense" morphing into "offense" horrifies many Japanese who have been conditioned by the principle of "defensive defense" (*senshu bôei*) as the sole role of Japan's SDFs.

When they see or hear the word "war," the residents of the Ryukyus reflexively recall the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. People suffered enormous, needless hardships and casualties then. Especially galling were the deaths of civilians by order or at the hand of the Japanese army. Today, thanks to the International Humanitarian Law (especially, Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977), a new war could be a civilized one, in which fighting could be limited to military combatants and destruction to military targets, sparing civilians the ravages of war.

## (2) Non-defended localities

The Law of War stipulates certain international arrangements for civilian safety during a war between law-abiding states. ("Law-abiding states waging war on each other" is a contradiction in terms. In today's civilized world, war is outlawed except in cases of strictly defined self-defense. Between civilized states that are duty-bound to uphold international law, negotiations in good faith should be able to resolve all disputes that in former eras might have permitted states to go to war. Unfortunately the real world is still imperfect and human impulses may touch off the threat or use of force - a modern legal term that includes war - between states.)

What are these arrangements and how can civilians take advantage of them when their nation goes to war with another? The civilians of the Ryukyus remember clearly that their nation (Japan) was wrong-headed and failed to protect them in the last war. Remembering the experiences of the Battle of Okinawa, Professor Hiroyuki Fujinaka of the University of the Ryukyus explores one of the international arrangements for civilian safety in his article "The Significance and Issues of Declarations by Local Governments That They Are 'Non-defended Localities' ... [by Virtue of] Article 59, Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol No. 1" (Japanese text) in the *Shohō* (Institute Report) of the Institute of Regional Study, Okinawa University, No. 30 (2003), pp. 143-158.

The Additional Protocol No. 1, Chapter V (Localities and Zones Under Special Protection) consists of Article 59 (Non-defended Localities) and Article 60 (Demilitarized Zones). In its first paragraph, Article 59 states: **"It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities."** The second paragraph shows how localities obtain the "non-defended" status: "The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party."

Paragraph 2 specifies conditions to be fulfilled by a non-defended locality as follows:

- (a) All combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must have been evacuated;
- (b) No hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
- (c) No acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
- (d) No activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.

In the Southern Ryukyus, with one exception, the inhabited islands already meet the above conditions. The singular exception is Miyakojima, the largest of the Miyako group of islands, where there is a military radar site. If this facility is evacuated, all the islands in this region will be qualified for becoming an archipelago of "non-defended localities."

The "non-defended" status of a locality becomes complete when the other party to the conflict is informed of it and accepts it as such. Article 59, Paragraph 4 states:

The declaration made under paragraph 2 shall be addressed to the adverse party and shall define and describe as precisely as possible, the limits of the non-defended locality. The Party to the conflict to which the declaration is addressed shall acknowledge its receipt and shall treat the locality as a non-defended locality....

To make sure that the belligerents observe the rules of humanitarian conduct in war, the Protocol, Article 5, Paragraph 1) requires: "It is the duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that conflict to secure the supervision and implementation of the Conventions and of this Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting Powers..." Article 5, Paragraph 2 commands: "From the beginning ... each party to the conflict shall without delay designate a Protecting Power for the purpose of applying the Conventions and this Protocol and shall ... permit the activities of a Protecting Power which has been accepted by it as such after designation by the adverse Party." Thus an armed conflict becomes an inter-state activity supervised by a third party of Protecting Powers.

The Protecting Powers will keep an eye on the conduct of the parties to the conflict with Article 59, among others, on mind. To repeat the strong language of Paragraph 1, **it is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities.** There is no doubt that a faithful

implementation of this injunction will ensure civilian safety. Besides, this way of preventing civilian casualties costs nothing to the countries at war and is clearly superior, in terms of cost effectiveness, to all the elaborate civilian evacuation and rescue plans that the defense planners have put on the books. That best defense is no defense is a gem of wisdom one would hardly have expected to find in the Law of War. Indeed, its alias -- Humanitarian Law -- is well deserved. From this standpoint, that many small islands in the Ryukyus are defenseless should be a cause for celebration. To attempt to defend them by deploying SDFs there would be a gross folly. Instead, the Japanese government should be prepared to declare them “non-defended localities” as it coasts down the collision course against China.

### **(3) Demilitarized zones**

Supplementing Professor Fujinaka’s discussion of “non-defended localities,” we might note that the Protocol also puts “demilitarized zones” under special protection (Article 60). The conditions the demilitarized zones must meet are the same as those described above for non-defended localities except for some wording adjustments. The parties to a conflict must conclude an express agreement on conferring the status of demilitarized zone on areas to be made free of military operations. While non-defended localities are so declared when and where they are near or in a zone of hostilities, demilitarized zones may be agreed upon “in peacetime as well as after the outbreak of hostilities” (Article 60, Paragraph 2). This suggests that a demilitarized zone is a longer-term arrangement and covers a larger area than a non-defended locality.

Governments are not likely to accord high priority to civilian safety in their thinking of military strategy. The Japanese thinking, for example, assumes that war will come to Japan some day and provides by law for the evacuation of civilians in the wake of an outbreak of hostilities. The residents of small islands such as the Ryukyus know by experience that evacuation of any form or means, once their land, sea and air have become a war zone, is unlikely to save life. Ryukyuans have already voiced apprehensions about their fate in the event emergencies descend on “areas surrounding Japan,” a phrase that conceals the identity of areas most likely implied in it; that is, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

### **(4) Neutralization of the Ryukyu Islands**

A more solid and respectable arrangement is a “neutralized” area based on multi-state agreements. Since the primary objective of neutralization is to prevent any state from using a given area for military purposes, neutralization overlaps with demilitarization. Neutralization as well as neutrality of whole states has a long history in parallel with the history of war. Neutralization of parts of states occurs in border regions that afford the occupying state a commonly perceived strategic advantage over the neighboring states that also claim sovereignty over the regions in question. The alternative is frequent wars between the contesting states over the control of these regions. Although humanitarian concerns about civilian safety probably do not play a major role in the states’ war-or-peace calculus, the reduction or elimination of risks of war by neutralizing strategically critical areas contributes to civilian safety.

Among neutralized islands, three are most frequently talked about: Aaland Islands in the Baltic Sea; Corfu, of Ionian Islands; and Spitzbergen (in Norwegian: Svalbard), a group of Arctic islands. These neutralized islands have experienced a similar historical misfortune: i.e., claims to sovereignty over them by two or more states. A state’s motive for possessing these islands was a gain in strategic advantage by fortifying them. When they were neutralized, sovereignty over them would no longer be a security gain over any other state, or to give it a positive spin, all countries would gain an equal peace dividend.

The residents of the Ryukyu Islands would empathize with the historical experiences of these neutralized islands and even envy them for their good luck that the armed states around them had good enough senses to give up the excitement of war for the serenity of peace. This is similar to the historical solution that worked well for China, Japan and Ryukyu until Meiji Japan changed its mind and opted in favor of Western-style expansionism. Today the Ryukyuans are in an unhappy situation to have to keep struggling against the Japanese and U.S. military bases to demilitarize the Ryukyu Islands. May the lessons of the neutralized islands of the world strengthen the Ryukyuans’ will to survive and enrich their peaceable means of dealing with the warlike empires such as Japan and the United States! (kt)

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## Plus Ça Change? The Naha City Mayoral Election

The Naha city mayoral election of November 14, 2004 ended with no big bang at all. That surely is why its result has not been widely discussed among the citizens of Naha or the local political elite, let alone among political scientists, who – let's be self-critical for once – mainly tend to focus their interest on the nearly or really sensational election results. This short piece, from the distance of some months, aims to shed light on the question of what impact the mayoral election may nevertheless have had on Okinawa politics. The story of the election will be told briefly and followed by some analysis of the coalitions and concerns involved. The author – who experienced the election living in Naha and also had the opportunity to temporarily serve on one of the candidates' campaign teams – will take the liberty to add some personal experiences.

She would have been the first female mayor of Naha: Takazato Suzuyo who was endorsed by the Social Mass Party, Social Democratic Party, Japanese Communist Party, Democratic Party and the Liberal League. She gained 55,827 votes. Rival candidate, Onaga Takeshi, in office as the city's mayor since 2000, drew 75,292 votes and won his second term. He was being supported by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito. The overall voter turnout was 56.4 per cent.

A brief comparison with the mayoral election of 2000 might clarify the significance of these numbers. The 2000 election that Onaga won was quite a landmark in the history of Naha's mayoral elections: After 32 years of reformist alliances in charge, the conservatives managed to win over the Naha voters in 2000. The conservatives since then have been holding both posts, governor of Okinawa and mayor of Naha, at the same time – unique in Okinawa's post-reversion history. The voter turnout in the 2000 mayoral election was 63 per cent – the lowest of the past seven elections. It dropped even further in the 2004 election. The margin between the candidates in the 2000 election, Onaga Takeshi and Horikawa Michiko, was 7,216 votes; in the 2004 election the margin rose to 19,465 votes. These figures lead to believe that the overall interest in the mayoral election in 2004 was at best lukewarm. Also, one might anticipate that the polarization of voters was anything but distinct – surprising in view of the clearly structured campaign coalitions and their differing political goals. Voter support for the challenger side must have been particularly weak. Or was it that support for the incumbent side was particularly strong? Indeed, it needs to be noted in this context that the Komeito for the first time in 2000 and for the second time in 2004 formed a campaign (and subsequently governing) coalition with the Liberal Democrats.

The campaign camps were clearly structured. So were the campaign promises. Broadly discussed in any public statement by each candidate as well as during a battle of words between the two of them – which was broadcasted by local TV stations – were city finances, economy and employment, military bases, and forms of political participation by citizens. The candidates' main viewpoints on these issues were as follows: With regard to city finances Onaga promised to rethink the number of public officials; Takazato aimed for an extension of educational institutions and social welfare structures. On the issue of economy and employment Takazato promised to strive for 10,000 additional jobs in Naha; Onaga proclaimed an extended construction project for Onoyama Park. The center point of Onaga's policy towards military bases was an appeal

towards the central government for guaranteeing Naha a minimum consent based on the bilateral SACO agreement. Takazato demanded the unconditional return of the Naha military port to civil use. Finally, on the point of political participation by citizens the ideas clashed as follows: full cooperation between politicians and citizens as proposed by Takazato versus Onaga's idea of a trustworthy city hall. Reflecting these approaches it becomes clear that Onaga proposed a policy of dealing as smoothly as possible within given circumstances. Takazato, on the other hand, aimed for radical changes.

The author, being passionate about her early-bird jogging, recalls one sunny November morning four or five days ahead of the mayoral election: on my way from Higashi-machi in Naha city (where I used to live) I sometimes crossed route 58, next to the Naha city bus terminal. From there I would run towards a large intersection and a bridge over the Tsubo River to nearby Onoyama Park. Both, the bus terminal as well as the street crossings around the Tsubo River, are major traffic junctions filled with thousands of potential voters every morning. It must have been shortly past seven a.m. The first thing that caught my attention was one of those white speaker-trucks with a rooftop right next to the bus terminal. Takazato Suzuyo and her campaign manager were on the rooftop making brief statements on political proposals. A handful of volunteers were standing around the truck handing out flyers. Scenery in orange colors – Takazato's cloths, the volunteers' outfits, posters and flyers, all were held in orange. Once the speeches were done with, the truck got moving, Takazato's campaign song (Inochi kagayaku Naha no machi – City of Naha, sparkling with life) started playing, and gone they were – off to the next “gig”. The curious author was free to continue her way to the park: the crossing over the Tsubo River, however, was crowded with people! Some two-hundred volunteers – mostly men in their 30s and 40s – all with the same green headbands, Onaga's trademark, were lined up along the streets on every single corner of the crossing. Posters were held up; “good morning, please give us your support” was continuously being shouted towards cars passing by, or rather cars being caught in the very usual Naha traffic jam. Scenery in green – very strictly organized; even the spaces between the volunteers along the streets seemed to have been measured accurately. By the time I started my jog in Onoyama Park my head was spinning significantly faster than my legs. What I had just seen were two totally different election campaigns and I couldn't help but wonder in which numbers these differences would result on Election Day.

In retrospect, I also ask myself: was the people's choice of November 14, 2004 a choice based on the merits of candidates and policies, or was it an expression of preference for a certain political atmosphere? If it was a choice for candidates and policies, people might have reasoned along the lines: “vote for what you know and what you might be able to predict; avoid any risk!” They voted for a candidate who had been around in local politics for many years and made his way through various party functions in the LDP. They shunned a social activist, a relatively new kid on the block of traditional political structures. They also voted for policies that were not very different from what they had been experiencing so far. They avoided methods and goals that might have been unheard of in Okinawa politics.

What about atmosphere? One wonders how the change of atmosphere from the electoral success of the liberal wing in the Upper House election of the summer of 2004 to a conservative mood of “stick with what you know” could have occurred so quickly. Such

a mood shift was especially remarkable in view of the atmosphere of anti-base activism that once again intensified over the course of this very time frame: the sit-in in Henoko, and activism around the black wall of Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku – a result of the U.S. military helicopter crash in August 2004 – come to mind. While the overall atmosphere in Okinawa must be characterized as rather favorable for progressive political ideas at the time in question, what happened in Naha, capital of Okinawa was that the conservative mayor in office gained a second term. It might indeed be necessary to think of this election result as independent from any political atmosphere. It might be understood solely as a matter of local politics, of a choice for status quo over reform. The overall progressive mood of Okinawa did not catch fire in Naha. Or, put in other words, the progressive camp's campaign failed to translate existing sympathy towards their proposed policies into votes for Takazato. A lack of infrastructural resources may be one reason for it. Another might be a tight campaign budget. Any potential reasons given here, however, cannot exceed the level of pure speculation without any quantitative research on the election having been conducted so far.

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Some months after the election, the question remains: “plus ça change?” With regard to the impact of the election on political coalitions and policies in Naha, the answer to this question seems very simple and obvious indeed: no changes in sight so far. However, the election might very well have had an impact on the political atmosphere in Naha. It is always difficult to measure changes in atmosphere, attitude, values and other “soft” criteria relevant to politics. In fact, this might indeed be one of the hardest tasks in social sciences. The mayoral election, the public discourses surrounding it, the picture the media drew of it; all this would have influenced the political atmosphere before, during and after Election Day. It seems impossible to grasp all those influences. So let me be bold and pick out one change in atmosphere that I perceived as being rather obvious: a significant degree of gender empowerment could be noticed in Naha during the election campaign. Although Takazato did not succeed in becoming the first female mayor of Naha, she gained tremendous popularity and aroused considerable public and media interest not only in her current campaign, but also in her long-term struggles for gender equality and women's role in general in Okinawa. Also, her group of volunteers – the orange shirts – who reshaped the city's image at major locations in the days leading up to the election, contributed in spreading these ideals: most of them were women from various volunteer groups and of various generations, most of whom at one point or another in the past had cooperated on women's issues with Takazato. Last November in Naha, women shook up politics. In the run-up to the mayoral election, gender equality quite visibly made its way into the streets of Naha. We might cautiously predict that before long it will also make its way – into a prominent position – on the city's political agenda.

Gabriele Vogt

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## Publications (XLVII)

We are grateful for the following gifts of publications.

*Gajumaru*. 2002, 2003. Edited and published by YOSHIMOTO Yukio. Volumes 19, 20. Tokyo. 122, 142 pp. A journal of memoirs, reflections and literary arts maintained by Japanese residents of Kikaijima origin outside the Island. Each issue contains contributions of varying lengths on diverse topics by more than 50 authors. Since space is limited, several authors serialize their contributions. No. 20, published in March 2004, commemorates the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Amami reversion to Japan that took place in December 1953. Several authors write on aspects of Amami's postwar history (8 years under American occupation and 50 years back with Japan).

HIGA, Koubun. 2004. *'Okinawa dokuritsu' no keifu* (Genealogy of 'Okinawa Independence'). Naha: Ryukyu Shinpo-sha. 346 pp. ¥1,780. An excellent primer to the history of ideas and movements for an independent Okinawa. Part I offers semi-biographical narratives on six well-known independence activists. Part II evaluates under-currents of thought supporting Okinawa independence. Part III summarizes the controversy over the indeterminate status of Okinawa and Okinawans' search for a solution.

Hôsei University Institute for Okinawan Studies. 2005. *Okibunken Shohô* (IOS Report), No. 56. Tokyo. 72 pp. In the past few years, this publication has grown into a promising academic journal of Okinawan studies. In this issue, there are articles, book reviews, summary reports on activities of study groups, notes on the operations of the Institute, obituaries, a catalogue of recent publications in Okinawan studies, and so on. The lead article is "*Okinawa bunka no genzô*" (The Original Shape of Okinawan Culture) by Professor ICHIZUMI Chie, who argues that the roots of Okinawan Culture are in South and Southeast Asia. He supports his argument with numerous examples of Ryukyuan words that appear to have originated in Sanscrit, Indonesian, or other Southeast Asian languages. Professor NAKAHODO Masanori contributes a powerful essay on the state of the art of Okinawan literature available in English that began with the Institute's translation project. Achievements of Professors Rabson and Molasky are greatly acclaimed and appreciated.

Idem. 2005. *Ryukyu Yaeyamajima torishirabesho Zen II* (Record of Investigations of Ryukyu Yaeyama Islands). 178 pp. A reprint and photo copy of the historic reports on the results of comprehensive investigations of Yaeyama Islands undertaken for SASAMORI Gisuke, author of a classic, *Namtô tanken* (Explorations in Southern Islands)(1894).

Idem. 2005. *Ryukyu no hôgen* (Dialects of Ryukyu), No. 29. 120 pp. Five articles on various aspects (vocabulary, accent, phonetics, phonology, literature, etc.) of dialects from several localities such as Oki-Erabujima, Kudakajima, Ogimison Takazato, Shuri, Kobama and Miyara.

Idem. 2004. *Okinawa bunka kenkyû* (Okinawa Culture Studies), Vol. 31. Tokyo. 707 pp. A special edition in memory and honor of the late Professor NAKAMURA Akira (1912-2003), founding president of the Institute, former president of Hôsei University, and former member of the House of Counselors. More than 40 percent of the volume is devoted to the reproduction of Professor Nakamura's works (essays related to Okinawa, photo copies of paintings, poems, and bibliography) and eulogies by a number of his colleagues and former students. The rest of the volume contains ten articles in Okinawan studies. Most impressive is the 100-plus-page article that examines and reproduces an 18<sup>th</sup>-Century Ryukyuan textbook on practical Mandarin: *Akagi Bunko-zô 'Kuanwa [C. Guanhua] mondô bengô' kô* (An Inquiry into 'Useful Words for Conversation in Mandarin' in the Akagi Collection). The text contains 46 settings of conversation between a Ryukyuan student and his Chinese counterpart in Fujian. The content describes various phases of a foreign student's life in China. Besides bibliographic value, it would also be useful for historians, ethnographers, socio-linguists, etc.

Okinawa University Institute of Regional Study. 2003. *Shohô* (Institute Report), Nos. 28, 29, 30. 120, 72, 208 pp. No. 29 is a special issue on recent changes in *kyôdôten* (community stores) that arose in rural Okinawa shortly after the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as a form of communal resistance to the encroachments of capitalist market economy. Nos. 28 and 30 contain numerous articles on topics related to Okinawa.

Professor FUJINAKA Hiroyuki, whose paper on Geneva Conventions in No. 30 touched off our discussion of civilian protection in wartime, has another article on a related topic, in No. 28: “The [unwelcome?] Deployment to Okinawa of ‘Rapid Response Units Specialized in Island Defense’ of the Ground Self-Defense Force” (Japanese text).

Okinawa International University Institute of Ryukyuan Culture. 2003, 2004. *NANTO BUNKA/Bulletin of the Institute of Ryukyuan Culture*. Nos. 25, 26. 72, 83+51 pp. The scope of Ryukyuan/Okinawan studies has greatly expanded lately thanks to scientific and technological advances. For example, in these issues of the Bulletin, there is a spurt in geographical studies that apply modern techniques of cartography, aerial survey, multi-dimensional simulation, etc. to the examination of historical documents, maps and illustrations, resulting in greater precision of the geographical dimension of historical dynamics. Noteworthy are: “Changing Patterns of Land Use in Nishihara Town” by Mamoru OGAWA (No. 25); “Utilization of Land Registry to Reconstruct Historical Space: The Geographical Characteristics of Areas with Endemic Malaria” by Yasushi SAKIHARA (ibid.); “The Reconstruction of Prewar Chatan Area Landscape Using American Aerial Reconnaissance Photography: Utilization of 3D Flight Simulation Software” by Yasushi WATANABE (No. 26). Another technological expansion of R/O studies is seen in the use of films: “The Legacy of Prewar Okinawan Film: Okinawa as Captured in Short Archival Films” by Tomohito TAMAKI (No. 26). The rise of these new genres of R/O studies does not mean decline, let alone fall, of conventional types of R/O studies. In No. 26, a paper modestly titled “A Tentative Theory of *Jiwari* [Land Reallocation] System Origins” (No. 26) by Tameichi KUROSHIMA appears to be last definitive word that puts to rest the long controversy on this subject.

Okinawa Prefectural Foundation for Cultural Promotion, Historiographical Institute. 2005. *Rekidai Hōan Yakuchūbon Daijūssatsu (Rekidai Hōan Translated and Annotated, Vol. 11)*. Translation and annotation by KOJIMA Shinji. 22+449 pp. “Translation” refers to the Japanese way of reading Chinese text (*yomikudashi*), which is not exactly a translation. The “Japanese” text retains practically all the original Chinese characters. Real ‘translation’ into Japanese will be the next step, for which the meaning of the Chinese words must be understood first. Annotations and explanations of these words are therefore indispensable. This volume covers the period of 1826-1835. During this period, Ryukyu’s biennial tributary missions to Beijing came and went with perfect regularity. Many documents therefore look like copies of the same form letters. Tedium is broken, however, by documents regarding felicities in the imperial family, Ryukyuan shipwrecks off the Chinese coast, death and succession in the Ryukyuan court, etc. On the whole, this volume projects a typical image of mature Sino-Ryukyuan sovereign-vassal relations.

Idem. 2005. *Rekidai Hōan Yakuchūbon Daijūssatsu Gochū Ichiranhyō (Consolidated Indexes of Annotations for Vol. 11)*. *Rekidai Hōan* Editing Reference Material No. 9. 178 pp. An indispensable companion for reading the *Rekidai Hōan*, Vol. 11.

Idem. 2004. *Dai-7-kai Ryukyu-Chūgoku kōshōshi ni kansuru simpozium ronbunshū (A Collection of Papers Presented at the 7th Symposium on the History of Ryukyu-China Relations)*. Bilingual: Japanese, pp. 1-157; Chinese, pp. 159-264. Photos of participants and scenes of the conference. The symposium was held at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives on October 18, 2003. There were eight presentations, of which six were by Chinese authors. Each paper in this volume is in two versions, Chinese and Japanese. Topics discussed are: knowledge and skills acquired in Fujian by Ryukyuan; historical maps related to Ryukyu at the Qing palace archives; classification and analysis of Ryukyuan emissaries to China; rescue and relief of shipwrecked Ryukyuan by Chinese authorities; commercial problems associated with the Chinese investiture missions to Ryukyu; termination of Sino-Ryukyuan sovereign-vassal relations; piracy problems in the East China Sea (two papers).

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