

The Ryukyuanist

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This issue concentrates on Okinawa's most serious problem: removal of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) from a densely populated city, Ginowan. Literally everyone agrees on the necessity of this. But the governments of the United States and Japan ask: where should the MCAS be relocated? Civilian population everywhere has long since answered the question by shouts of NIMBY (not in my backyard). In Okinawa, the U.S. and Japan shout back YIYBY (yes in your backyards). Woe unto those Okinawans whose backyards are coveted by the world's two most powerful countries! What to do? Below we continue the discussion of the subject begun in the last issue.

We thank *Japan Focus* for an extensive coverage of Okinawa issues in its weekly postings (p.6). Publications (LI) (p.8)

Futenma replacement: Okinawa's long winter SCC (October 29, 2005) to SCC (May 1, 2006)

On May 1, 2006, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC, a.k.a. "2 plus 2") issued a report titled **United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation**, finalizing the initiatives and recommendations made in the previous October 29, 2005 announcement, **U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future**. Initially the **Roadmap** was to be completed by March 2006, but the Government of Japan (GOJ) ran into strong opposition of the adversely affected local governments and communities, especially those in Okinawa, to the 10/29 SCC proposals. GOJ tried to win the localities' understanding and consent by various techniques of persuasion ranging from crude intimidation to bribing with economic incentives while sticking firmly to the letter of the 10/29 SCC report. But local resistance persisted. Eventually GOJ abandoned further efforts for "sincere and patient" persuasion (as it described its posture). The May 1, 2006 Roadmap left the resisting localities of Japan behind in the interest of repairing the already strained U.S.-Japan relations that GOJ feared would worsen by a further delay. To paraphrase a popular Japanese metaphor, *mikiri hassha*, the stationmaster (GOJ) lost patience and blew the whistle for departure giving up the wait for any more tardy passengers (the recalcitrant localities) to arrive. For GOJ, U.S.-Japan relations were apparently more important than GOJ-local relations.

"General Will" and political division in Okinawa

Okinawans are generally opposed to the SCC plan to build a Futenma replacement facility (FRF) for the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma (MCAS Futenma). A "best choice" supported by a broad cross-section of Okinawans has always been the removal of MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa coupled with the return of the vacated land to its rightful owners. Before October 29, 2005, Okinawa urged GOJ to discuss this universal wish of Okinawans with the U.S. Government (USG) and to make it come true. GOJ apparently chose not to put it on agenda for serious negotiation. (There is some confusion on this point. At an informational symposium held in Naha on December 17, 2005, former Director General of Japan's Defense Agency Ono Yoshinori, who was one of the two representatives of Japan at the "2 plus 2" meetings, said that the Okinawan demand for Futenma removal without replacement was not discussed at these meetings at all. Another representative of Japan, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka corrected him on that matter a few days later and Ono admitted his error.)

For Governor Inamine Keiichi and the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG), the "best choice" has also been the transfer of MCAS Futenma to outside of Okinawa. Early on, bowing to the displeasures of GOJ and USG regarding Okinawa's "best choice," Inamine and OPG settled for a second best, which took shape as a plan for a military/civilian joint use offshore airport with full civilian use after 15 years. GOJ commended Inamine for willingness to allow an FRF within Okinawa Prefecture and co-opted his idea of an offshore airport for the FRF as an official plan (though without a firm commitment to the 15-year term limit on its military use).

Later Governor Inamine saw in the new U.S. policy for realignment and transformation of the U.S. bases overseas a welcome opportunity to give Okinawa's cherished "best choice" a chance for serious consideration within the realignment/ transformation framework. Thus he explicitly formulated Okinawa's choices to be two-tiered. The "best" choice to be pursued most seriously was the transfer of MCAS Futenma to outside of Okinawa. The official offshore airport plan was put on a backburner. Governor Inamine then declared that he would not accept any other

plan. As a result, the governor and OPG strongly rejected the “shoreline plan” adopted by GOJ and USG at the 10/29 “2 plus 2” meeting.

Ostensibly in the interest of synchronized local and prefectural choices, **Nago City** earlier supported the Inamine/GOJ offshore airport plan, which had been adopted by GOJ at the Cabinet Council (*kakugi*) in December 1999. But Nago’s commitment to this plan was not rock-solid. In the run-up to the 10/29 “2 plus 2” agreement, USG proposed a scaled-down offshore airport to be built on shoals closer to the Henoko shoreline than the site for the official Inamine/GOJ plan. Nago Mayor Kishimoto Tateo went on record voicing support for the U.S. “shoals plan,” implying a rejection of both the Japanese plan (inland FRF in Camp Schwab – “hillside plan”) and the Inamine/GOJ plan. (By the time the GOJ-USG realignment negotiation began in February 2005, GOJ and USG had quietly junked the Inamine/GOJ plan as infeasible. Governor Inamine did not know it. Even after the announcement of the 10/29 report, he maintained that the Inamine/GOJ plan of 1999 was still the official plan of Japan.)

Although Nago City wavered as to the size and location of the sea-based FRF, it still was an ally of Governor Inamine in common opposition to the 10/29 Shoreline Plan agreed upon between GOJ and USG. This peculiar Nago-Inamine alliance of convenience was able to keep up Okinawa’s appearance of united opposition to the 10/29 “2 plus 2” initiatives for months, but eventually broke down. GOJ exploited the submerged rift between Nago and Inamine and worked on subduing Nago as a step toward bringing Inamine to heel. With Nago first and then Inamine caving in to the demand of GOJ, the road was paved for the next big thing – the May 1, 2006 **Roadmap for Implementation**.

Okinawa’s civil society protested the 10/29 Shoreline Plan for FRF in many ways and forms. When GOJ and USG were debating the last details of the 10/29 report, five well-known public intellectuals of Okinawa published a people’s position paper in the Asahi Shinbunsha’s journal *Ronza* (September 2005). An English translation of this article appears in *Japan Echo* (February 2006) titled “U.S. Bases: Time to Ease Okinawa’s Burden.” Its authors are Miyazato Seigen (best known for his peerless scholarship on the U.S. occupation of Okinawa), Oshiro Tatsuhiro (Okinawa’s premier novelist of the Akutagawa Prize fame), Sunagawa Keishin (former president of the University of the Ryukyus), Yamazato Kiyoshi (professor of biology and a specialist on coral reef) and Gabe Masa’aki (a leading American studies scholar in Okinawa and Japan).

Miyazato *et al* argue three points: (1) no new imposition of military bases in Okinawa; (2) prompt closure of MCAS Futenma; and (3) halt to the construction of FRF at Henoko. These three points are a common denominator of Okinawa’s demands regarding the U.S. bases. After October 29, 2005, numerous individuals and groups took similar positions. Large and small mass rallies took place to broadcast Okinawa’s demands to the world.

This widespread dissatisfaction with the U.S. bases in general and the 10/29 Shoreline Plan in particular snowballed into a massive rally of 35,000 participants on March 5, 2006. The organizing committee named this rally **Okinawa Prefecture Residents’ General Uprising** [*Okinawa kenmin sōkekki taikai*] **Against a Special Measures Law to Suspend the Gubernatorial Right to Regulate Land Reclamation in Public Waters and to Oppose the Shoreline Plan for Futenma Replacement Adopted Over the Heads of Okinawa Residents**. This long cumbersome title of the rally captures the two most important items on the list of demands made by the Uprising. (The existing laws empower a prefectural governor to approve or disapprove land reclamation projects in the prefecture’s territorial waters. It was rumored that GOJ might pass a special measures law to preempt Governor Inamine’s use of this gubernatorial power to obstruct land reclamation needed by the Shoreline Plan. The “Uprising” wanted to prevent such a move of GOJ. Further, the Uprising wanted to remind GOJ of its public promise, repeatedly made before 10/29, that no new U.S. military bases would be planned or agreed upon without prior consent of communities likely to be affected adversely. The conclusion of the 10/29 “2 plus 2” agreement was a violation of this public promise of GOJ.)

By showing objectives supported by the “general will” of the Okinawa people, the organizers of the March Uprising intended to make the rally non-partisan. But conspicuously absent from it were Governor Inamine, who had been pursuing the same objectives vigorously for some time, and his supporters in the prefectural assembly. Also absent were the conservative members of the Japanese Diet elected from Okinawa. On the other hand, non-conservative members of Diet and Assembly were there in force. Far from presenting a supra-partisan united front against the U.S. bases, the March Uprising appeared to expose the inability of Okinawa’s “general will” to overcome the existing political division, a point lamented openly by Higa Mikio, a former vice-governor with the conservative

Governor Nishime Junji (in office 1989-1990) and co-chair of the organizing committee of the rally. Another co-chair was Yamanouchi Tokushin, former treasurer with the reformist Governor Ota Masahide (in office 1990-1998). GOJ and USG may have seen another proof of “divided Okinawa” in the March Uprising.

Shortly after the Uprising, it was reported that GOJ was preparing to abandon its attempts to secure local understanding on the 10/29 “2 plus 2” agreement and to resort to *mikiri hassha*; that is, to speedily finalize the 10/29 initiatives without local consent. The document had set the deadline for the “finalization” as follows:

The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to **finalize** these specific interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules **no later than March 2006** (emphasis added).

By early March 2006, the extent and strength of popular discontent and protests in not only Okinawa but practically all the affected localities throughout Japan had apparently convinced GOJ that “local coordination” would not be completed by the end of March. Rather than “losing face” for political incompetence, the Koizumi Cabinet chose to save face vis -à-vis USG by imposing by decree the 10/29 “2 plus 2” initiatives on those recalcitrant localities. GOJ’s preference for honoring its international commitments at the risk of domestic unrest further aggravated popular discontent. On March 12, 2006, the residents of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture soundly defeated in a referendum one of the 10/29 “2 plus 2” initiatives: i.e., transfer of carrier air wings from Atsugi to Iwakuni. The press and media quickly dubbed it “Iwakuni Shock” to GOJ and USG. Shortly after this happening, USG expressed reluctance in joining GOJ’s *mikiri hassha* by leaving disgruntled localities behind. USG apparently did not want to share with GOJ the responsibility for instigating Japan’s local unrest. GOJ had already lost face.

However, GOJ still had a face-saving way of pacifying the rebellious localities: i.e., by beating Okinawa hard. The March Uprising of Okinawa adopted a resolution condemning the 10/29 “2 plus 2” agreement concluded over the heads of local communities and demanded the cancellation of the Shoreline Plan for FRF. The resolution was sent to Prime Minister Koizumi and other ministers of GOJ. In mid-March, a delegation appointed by the Uprising for action in Tokyo visited GOJ, but the Koizumi Administration had no ear to lend to Okinawa’s pleas. The delegates returned to Okinawa, crest-fallen as it were, after a meeting with opposition party members of Diet. As the remaining days of March quickly dwindled, GOJ’s beating of Okinawa became more merciless.

Okinawa caves in, or so it seems

For months after October 29, 2005, GOJ kept “explaining” the 10/29 “2 plus 2” initiatives to the affected prefectures and municipalities to secure their “understanding” (meaning consent, or at least acquiescence). In Okinawa, the harder GOJ tried to talk local people and governments into agreeing to the Shoreline Plan for FRF, the more bizarre its logic became. The Shoreline Plan would use part of the land already occupied by Camp Schwab and expands into the adjacent water areas. According to the Defense Agency, the Plan would be less costly and more feasible than the previous Inamine/GOJ plan because the areas occupied by the U.S. bases are off limits to the local protestors and construction would proceed undisturbed. In the past years, anti-base demonstrators and protestors effectively “sabotaged” work on offshore projects by surrounding the construction site with a flotilla of fishing boats and canoes and demoralizing the workers by electronically amplified urgings for peace, safety, dugong protection, etc. By November 2005, when GOJ suspended work on the offshore projects, estimates showed astonishing cost overruns – three times as high as the contracted budget. GOJ abrogated the contracts in March 2005, and it was reported that GOJ and the contractors might go to court for the settlement of the GOJ debt to the contractors (*The Ryukyu Shimpo*, March 19, 2005).

By contrast, the implementation of the Shoreline Plan would be peaceful because the construction site was within the U.S. base and adjacent water areas. Governor Inamine might interfere at the water’s edge, but by then the work on land would be complete and Inamine’s objection to the extension of work into the nearby water areas would sound rather foolish and toothless, so argued GOJ’s Defense Agency (though in polite language).

Okinawans were flabbergasted by this kind of argument for cost effectiveness coming from the Japanese government. For it was based on a tacit approval of the infamous “extraterritoriality” of the U.S. military bases in Japan protected by the Status of [U.S.] Forces Agreement (SOFA). The argument showed that the Japanese government was willing to take Okinawa’s land and sea by siding with the U.S. military. Okinawans asked “Isn’t the

Japanese government **our** government too?” and suspected that GOJ’s answer might be “No.” Okinawans were reminded of an unpleasant image of Okinawa as a joint military colony of the U.S. and Japan. (In Okinawa, there is a strong movement demanding the revision of SOFA. Governor Inamine is an advocate of the SOFA revision. So are Higa Mikio and Yamanouchi Tokushin, co-chairs of the March Uprising.)

How to overcome the stalemate between GOJ and Okinawa? GOJ concluded that Okinawa should be taught a lesson: i.e., national defense and international diplomacy exclusively belong to the jurisdiction of the State; local governments must support the State’s work in these policy areas --- an obsolete view of State powers that is still dearly held by GOJ leaders. When GOJ’s attitude began stiffening in this way, Okinawa began worrying about the consequences of the standoff over the Shoreline Plan. Nago City gave in first.

In Nago, the two-term Mayor Kishimoto’s health was devastated by the end of his second term. He chose not to run for a third term. On January 22, 2006, Shimabukuro Yoshikazu, Kishimoto’s handpicked successor, was elected mayor. Kishimoto died on March 27. He was credited with the exploitation of the Henoko FRF issue to Nago’s maximum advantage. GOJ reportedly resented Nago’s success to take the money and run leaving the FRF project languishing under popular protests. Now that the all-knowing witness to history was gone, GOJ found a great opportunity to retaliate against Nago with impunity. It was Shimabukuro’s tough luck that he had to face the awesome GOJ alone without the support and wise advices of former Mayor Kishimoto

The inexperienced Mayor Shimabukuro committed a major tactical error in handling Nago-GOJ relations. He announced a willingness to “consult” with GOJ on the FRF site, saying that Nago would agree to a site chosen by GOJ within a certain area on the map. (To “consult” [*kyōgisuru*] is a word GOJ loves to hear. It is a euphemism for “listening to and obeying GOJ.”) The area Nago suggested was the shallow water area between Henoko Point and the site of the still official Inamine/GOJ offshore airport. Nago claimed its legitimacy by calling it “a variation” of the GOJ’s official plan. It considered an FRF in this area acceptable because the site would be offshore enough to spare the residential areas aircraft accidents and noise pollutions from the air base operations.

GOJ rejected the Nago suggestion, because accepting it would require the land-based Shoreline Plan to move entirely into the water area and become sea-based, vulnerable to the disruptive civilian protests. But GOJ could not ignore Nago’s legitimate reasons behind the site choice. GOJ then hit upon a good idea; i.e., if an FRF could be built and operated free of the safety and environmental concerns that Nago kept repeating, its location perhaps would not matter much to Nago. That is, if a land-based facility could be shown to meet Nago’s safety and environmental requirements, there would be no reason for preferring an offshore FRF. So thought GOJ.

GOJ then offered Nago a riddle of “micro-adjustment” (*bichōsei*), a concept that would permit the Shoreline Plan to slide somewhat into the sea area suggested by Nago. On March 21, 2006, the Defense Agency Director General and the Nago Mayor began a “formal consultation” to nail down a mutually acceptable answer to this riddle. First, GOJ and Nago agreed on three conditions that the FRF should meet, wherever it was built: i.e., (1) prevention of dangers to local communities, (2) minimization of the environmental impact, and (3) attention to feasibility. The Nago Mayor, summoned by GOJ, commuted to Tokyo almost daily. Then voilà! On April 7, 2006, the Nago Mayor and the DA Director General reached an agreement on a “new” Shoreline Plan, which the Mayor boasted as GOJ’s acceptance of his “variation” of the official Inamine/GOJ Plan, while GOJ gloated over gains made without giving anything away. The way they talked about it in public, it was a Win-Win solution for Nago and GOJ. Was it?

Governor Inamine was unhappy about the Nago/GOJ agreement on the “micro -adjustment” of the Shoreline Plan. He continued to voice his opposition to any Henoko FRF other than the Inamine/GOJ offshore airport plan that was still in the books as the official plan sanctioned by the Cabinet Council. But being in office for seven and a half years during a turbulent period apparently had taken its toll of the governor’s health. On April 28, after months of wavering, he told his friends in the Japanese Diet (conservative members elected from Okinawa) that he would not run for his third term in the gubernatorial election due in November 2006 for reasons of health. At the same time, he vowed that during the remainder of his current term he would drain out the morass of the Futenma confusions to leave a clean slate for his successor. His supporters immediately began the search for a conservative candidate for governor.

The general public and various groups and movements that were against the old Shoreline Plan continued to oppose the new. Local protest rallies mushroomed in Nago and neighboring municipalities. In Henoko, the world-famous

“sit-in” group commemorated its second anniversary on April 19, 2006 and renewed its resolve for continued protest against the new Shoreline Plan. In Naha, representatives of Okinawa-wide anti-base movements visited Governor Inamine and encouraged him to keep up his opposition to the Nago/GOJ agreement. A public opinion poll taken by the Ryukyu Shimpōsha and Okinawa TV Broadcasting Co. showed that more than 70 percent of the respondents were against the new plan (*The Ryukyu Shimpō*, April 14, 2006).

The “New” Shoreline Plan (“V” Plan)

The Nago/GOJ agreement of April 7, 2006 directly went into the May 1, 2006 **Roadmap for Realignment Implementation** as follows:

The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including **two runways aligned in a “V”-shape**, each runway having a length of 1600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. (bolding added)

The runway on the left vector of the “V” (direction: NNW) is for arriving aircraft and the one on the right (direction: NE) is for those taking off. If these flight rules are rigorously obeyed as planned, aircraft will fly into the arrival runway from skies over the open seas and likewise fly out of the take-off runway without so much as brushing the nearest coastline. GOJ also promised to limit the circulation of aircraft in flight to the skies over the seas. Although these flight rules are supposed to prevent noise pollutions, aircraft crashes and emergency landings in residential areas, whether the U.S. Marines will honor these rules in practice is a great unknown at present. Helicopters from MCAS Futenma routinely circulate all over the congested city of Ginowan, one of them actually having crashed onto a nearby university campus.

The new Shoreline Plan leaves the old Shoreline Plan intact and adds a second runway on reclaimed land from a part of the water area proposed by Nago. There will be a net expansion of FRF, which according to our estimates, raises the total area of the facility from the old Plan’s 120 ha to the new Plan’s 216 ha, an 80-percent expansion. Nago’s demand for *moving* the old Plan to the water area morphed into GOJ’s win *to add* more area to it. This indicates built-in unequal bargaining power in the Japanese state-local system with rules and odds overwhelmingly favoring the state. One naturally wonders how the DA Director General and the Nago Mayor “consulted” over the *bichōsei* of the old Plan. The president of the Japan Social Democratic Party said that the mayor was “threatened” into agreeing (*The Ryukyu Shimpō*, April 9, 2006). On the night of April 13, two U.S. military helicopters circulated over the residential area of Henoko at a low altitude for three hours, as if to mock the stipulation in the Nago/GOJ agreement that there should be no flight of military aircraft over residential areas (*ibid.*, April 14, 2006). Nago filed a complaint with the Defense Facilities Management Agency.

Conclusion

“Futenma replacement” is a small subsection of the **Transformation and Realignment of Japan-U.S. Alliance**. The nature and scope of the alliance have changed considerably in recent years. The original *Anpo* framework is superseded by one in which Japanese views on national security are seamlessly merged with America’s, requiring an equally seamless merger of military operations, i.e., close “inter-operability” of the U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The vision of merged Japan-U.S. military capabilities looks to more firmly entrenching the U.S. military presence in Japan. Okinawa may be a part of Japan, but the U.S.-Japan alliance assigns to it roles unlike those of any other part of Japan. A new Japanese view of Okinawa, sensed from the Japanese government’s many confusing pronouncements, is that Okinawa is a “special geopolitical/strategic area” expected to fulfill distinctly different requirements. Specifications of these requirements will become clearer in the months to come.

The special geopolitical/strategic roles of Okinawa are implied in what the U.S. called “a package deal” around the time of the October 29, 2005 SCC report. In addition to the construction of a Futenma replacement facility at Henoko, Nago, the SCC recommended the transfer of a part of the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam, shifts of facilities and personnel south of Kadena to other places, return of the vacated land to Okinawa, re-location of the Naha military port, transfers of equipment and training activities to bases in Japanese mainland, increased joint uses of the U.S. bases with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and general consolidation and streamlining of the bases retained in Okinawa. The U.S. claimed that all these changes were so inter-related that they needed to be implemented altogether simultaneously with none left out or behind. In other words, these changes constituted “a

package deal.” Some of the changes are advantageous to Okinawa, though some like the Futenma replacement and joint uses of the existing bases with the SDF are not. When the package deal of recommended changes is completed, the remaining bases and personnel will also have been tightly realigned as “a packge,” i.e., as a close-knit system with enhanced efficiency and staying power. In other words, Okinawa alone within Japan will have a well-integrated system of permanent U.S. bases. Japan’s view of Okinawa as “a special geopolitical/strategic area” would smoothly accommodate such a future of the U.S. bases in Okinawa.
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Background information

“A comedy or a tragedy? The politics of term limits on a new U.S. military bases,” *The Ryukyuanist* No. 61

“SOFA: A symbol of sovereign failure of Japan?” *The Ryukyuanist* No. 64

“MCAS Futenma Relocation Plans: From SACO (1996) to SCC (2005)” *The Ryukyuanist* No. 69

“Face saving” U.S. Style. The current realignment movement, which is a part of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s grand scheme plus Secretary of State Rice’s transformational diplomacy, has produced what appears to be a partial “withdrawal” of U.S. bases and troops from Okinawa. William Safire tells us that “withdrawal” is a shameful act and that when it happens, some other word must be found to describe it. So the challenge is: “what word in English connotes withdrawal without weakness...” (“Diplolingo: Realigning Transformational Leadership,” *New York Times Magazine*, 6.11.06) When the Israeli government withdrew Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert chose a Hebrew word, for which a suitable English word does not exist. The word that the Israelis finally hit upon was “realignment” (hardly appropriate for the original word, *hitkansut*). There is then a new equation: “realignment = withdrawal.” A decade ago Okinawa Prefecture proposed a phased “base return action program” and the U.S. rejected it forcefully. It was no doubt taken as a base “withdrawal” plan. Lately Okinawa too uses “realignment” in the English-language materials for negotiation with the U.S.

Okinawa articles in *Japan Focus* <http://japanfocus.org> (November 2004 through April 2006)

In 2004, *The Ryukyuanist* (No. 65) saluted the new E-journal *Japan Focus* and took stock of its weekly postings on topics related or relevant to Okinawa over the period from its inauguration through October 2004. Since then, more “Okinawa articles” have appeared in *Japan Focus* --- one would even say, at an accelerated rate. To the best of our knowledge, *Japan Focus* is the only academic/intellectual journal in the United States that pays sustained attention to Okinawa as a region of importance on its own.

A click on “Okinawa” in the index produces a long list of articles on Okinawa. Below we first extract and list the articles that directly address problems of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa posted over the period of November 2004 through April 2006. In the second list, we assemble articles on other topics. This issue of *The R* narrowly focuses on one aspect of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, Futenma replacement. Clearly we need further readings for a fuller grasp of Okinawa’s *kichi mondai*. The numerous high-quality articles that *Japan Focus* has published on this problematique fill our needs.

We thank Professor Mark Selden of Cornell and his team of coordinators and associates of *Japan Focus* for recognizing the value of a subject that may seem unimportant to others – Okinawa – and publishing a growing stream of well-researched writings on it.

(1) *Kichi mondai* articles in *Japan Focus*

Asahi Shimbun and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Japan to Pay \$6 Billion to Move US Marines to Guam” (April 25, 2006)

Tom Engelhardt talks with Charmers Johnson, “The US Military Empire at Home and Abroad” (March 29, 2006). *The Ryukyuanist* considers Professor Johnson’s work on the Empire of Bases the most insightful philosophical and methodological guide for the study of Okinawa’s *kichi mondai*.

Eric Johnston, "The Iwakuni Referendum and the Future of the U.S. Military Base Realignment" (March 2006). Iwakuni is not in Okinawa. But it is another large U.S. Marine base in Japan. Under Realignment, Iwakuni and Okinawa share many problems in common.

Gavan McCormack, Sato Manabu, and Urasaki Etsuko, "The Nago Mayoral Election and Okinawa's Search for a Way Beyond Bases and Dependence" (February 16, 2006)

Makishi Yoshikazu, "U.S. Dream Come True? The New Henoko Sea Base and Okinawa Resistance" (February 12, 2006)

Masaki Hisane, "Okinawa Base Plan for U.S. Forces Boosted by Election" (January 26, 2006)

Miyagi Yasuhiro, "Okinawa --- Rising Magma" (December 9, 2005). The appearance of this article in *Japan Focus*, translated by Gavan McCormack, is hailed in Okinawa as a major publication coup (*The Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 14, 2005). The author Miyagi Yasuhiro is an opposition leader in Nago Assembly and a well-known activist in Okinawa's peace, anti-base, environmentalist movements.

Gavan McCormack, "Okinawa and the Revamped US-Japan Alliance" (November 16, 2005)

David McNeill, "People Power: Have Okinawan Protests Forced Tokyo and Washington to Rethink Their Base Plan?" (September 28, 2005)

David McNeill, "Freedom of the Press U.S. Style on Okinawa" (August 3, 2005)

Okubo Yoshio, "Okinawa's Futenma Base: A Sticking point in U.S.-Japan Relations" (March 10, 2005)

(2) Other Okinawa articles in *Japan Focus*

Hirano Chizu, "In Love and War: Memories of the Battle of Okinawa" (April 18, 2006)

Philip Brasor, "Lifting the Curtain on the U.S.-Japan Relationship" (April 3, 2006)

David McNeill, "Enemies of the State: Free Speech and Japan's Courts" (February 8, 2006)

Fukushima Mizuho, "The Constitution is Japan's Pledge of Peace to the World" (January 16, 2006)

Robert Eskildsen, "Whither East Asia? Reflections on Japan's Colonial Experience in Taiwan" (November 20, 2005).

Nishida Masaru. "The Ryukyus and the Taiwan Expedition of 1874: Toward Reconciliation After 130 years" (November 20, 2005).

Thomas J. Schoenbaum. "Resolving the China-Japan Dispute Over the Senkaku Islands" (February 17, 2005).

Patrick Heinrich, "Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu Islands" (November 10, 2005)

Mark Ealey, "The Martyrdom: Children and the Battle of Okinawa" (November 6, 2005)

Tomiyama Ichiro, "On Becoming 'a Japanese': The Community of Oblivion and Memories of the Battlefield" (October 19, 2005)

J. Sean Curtin, "Sea of Confrontation: Japan-China Territorial and Gas Dispute Intensifies" (October 19, 2005)

David Jacobson, "Disgraced Mainichi Journalist Reopens 30-year-old Scandal Over Okinawa Reversion" (July 2005)

Thomas J. Shoenbaum, "Resolving the China-Japan Dispute Over the Senkaku Islands" (February 17, 2005)

Publications (LI)

We gratefully acknowledge the receipt of the following gifts of publications.

Gajumaru. 2005. No. 21. A journal of love and memories of their native land by persons of Kikajima/ Amami origin or descent resident in Mainland Japan, Okinawa, and other places. Poetic imagery, poignant narcissism, teary sentimentality, and other secrets of the heart abound.

Gaiko Forum. 2004. Vol. 4 (Fall). "The Okinawa Treaty: A Diplomat's Vignette" by Charles Schmitz (pp. 61-63). The formal name of the "Okinawa Treaty" is "the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands," signed on June 17, 1971.

Japan Echo. 2006. Vol. 33 (February). "U.S. Bases: Time to Ease Okinawa's Burden" by Miyazato Seigen, Oshiro Tatsuhiro, Sunagawa Keishin, Yamazato Kiyoshi, and Gabe Masaaki (pp. 52-57), translated from an article in *Ronza* (September 2005). Referred to in the text above (p. 2).

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